Articals

24 July 2013

Pak Army Chief Appointment

Shahid Qureshi

Appointment of new COAS is a major decision for the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. I am sure he has learnt many things during his exile and one of them is the of merit. According to seniority list Lt General Haroon Aslam is on the top of the list with vast experience in dealing with terrorists involved in both domestic and international terrorism. It is irrelevant where he was in 1999 and what he was doing. The most important thing is he was following the orders from his commander. If MNS can take back ministers of General Musharraf cabinet why should he be discriminating someone who was part of military operation which Indians didn’t like? This policy of ‘us & them’ in political and military circles must end, all should be one page.

Pakistan and its Army has suffered due to the dictatorshiprespect s of Generals Auyb Khan , Yayaha Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharaf. Many brilliant officers were denied chance to reach on top because these dictators. It is high time for Prime Minister to start institution building by following open merit policy. Surely ideas and instructions move downwards from the top. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan have already suffered by the appointment of General Pervez Musharraf when senior officers were by passed.

Pakistan is facing major challenges at the moment:

(a)Treachery – conspiracies against Pakistan (b) Terrorism (c) Financial terrorism (d) Energy Crisis (e) Media War (Psychological War)

To deal with the above bravery is not enough but a cool, calculated and collected effort is required. A person who is experienced in dealing with all the above challenges or having in depth knowledge as well as leadership qualities can handle this better. MNS might be nervous about appointing a SSG (Commando) as COAS due to the Gen Pervez Musharraf’s misadventure. It was a miscalculation and probably a bad advice to him. But now merit should prevail. It is time for MNS to build his image in the armed forces as a statesman and appointment of the senior most will send a message down the spine of the armed forces that anyone can become COAS if he is on merit.

He needs a man who has in depth experience in dealing with terrorism and terrorists. Once law and order is maintained in the country economic activity will start automatically.  The media war and psychological war against Pakistan is in full swing at the moment and Pakistan seems defenceless. This war cannot be won or fought with tanks and jets. That’s where the elimination treacherous elements come as a top priority.

Once armed forces to go war politicians and intellectuals normally shut up and support their soldiers, keep their views for later because (a) it demoralise the soldiers,(b) negative impact on the moral (c) create doubts about the legitimacy of the mission. Pakistani politicians especially religious and other parties should show maturity, stop giving immature statements and should visit the soldiers on the front line.

MNS should also visit soldiers on the front line for moral boasting and confidence building with Pakistan’s army forgets about how Indians feel. This abusive relationship with Indian must end and MNS should keep away from dodgy characters.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif must let go his past and create a new prosperous Pakistan shining with rule of law, merit, peace and justice. The whole nation will be behind him.

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Indian Navy’s new white elephant

By S. M. Hali 

Former Soviet Navy Kiev class aircraft carrier Baku, which was renamed Admiral Gorshkov in the Russian Navy, was purchased by the Indian Navy (IN) in 2004. Renamed the INSVikramaditya, and re-fitted at a cost of US $2.35 billion but plagued by several delays as well as cost escalations, it has set sail for final delivery and acceptance trials.

The ship’s keel was laid down in 1978 at Nikolayev South in Ukraine. Launched in 1982, it was commissioned in December 1987. The vessel appears to be jinxed as it has been hit by delays from its inception. The delay in commissioning was attributable to software bugs in its command and control system. In 1994, following a boiler room explosion, the ship was docked for a year of repairs. Although she returned to service in 1995, she was finally withdrawn in 1996 and offered for sale. IN decided to purchase it in January 2004 but price haggling delayed the finalization of the deal till December 2009.

On September 17, 2012, the IN revealed that the Gorshkov (since the vessel was not rechristened as INS Vikramaditya yet) had failed its sea trials. The refitted aircraft carrier could not reach “full speed” due to malfunctioning boilers. Some of the 44,500-ton warship’s eight boilers broke down during the strenuous full-steam trials. The IN had planned on commissioning the Vikramadityaon December 4, 2012, “Navy Day”. Because of the failed sea trials, the warship had to undergo repairs and modifications that delayed its commissioning by nearly a year.

Upgrade of the vessel was undertaken by Russia’s major shipyard, Sevmash Enterprise, where it was stripped of all the weaponry from the ship’s foredeck to make way for a Short Take-off but Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) configuration involving arrester wires and tail hooks for the assisted landing; while a ski-jump has been installed on the bow.

The ship originally operated the vertical take-off and landing [VTOL] Yakolev Yak-38 aircraft. The retrofit enables IN to operate the more advanced MiG-29Ks from the deck. The ship can accommodate 18 MiG-29Ks in addition to 10 helicopters, including anti-submarine warfare [ASW] capable Kamov-28 helicopters and airborne early warning [AEW] Kamov-31 helicopters.

The aircraft carrier can reach a top speed of 32 knots and an endurance of 25,000 kilometers at a cruising speed of 18 knots. It is 283 meters in length with a beam of 511 meters. The carrier is propelled by four shaft-geared steam turbines generating 140,000 horsepower. The ship will have a crew of 1,400.

The carrier departed from the Sevmash shipyard on July 3 for four months’ trials to be conducted in the White and Barrents seas, which will involve the entire ship’s operations, its propulsion, and the functioning of the engine under stress conditions including ship-deck landing and take-off by MiG-29 K fighters before the delivery acceptance by IN.

India is already operating the INS Viraat, an ex-Royal Navy Centaur Class aircraft carrier equipped with Harrier Jump-jet V/STOL fighter aircraft and is in the process of indigenously constructing two more carriers. It is obsessed with competing with China and currently IN has an edge over China’s PLA Navy in the Aircraft Carrier capability. India should realize that possessing an aircraft carrier may be a symbol of power projection but operating a Carrier Group (CG), defending it from enemy air attacks, maintaining it and myriad other problems are a nightmare.

CGs are not restricted to a specific composition and can be modified according to threat perception and missions assigned during deployment. A typical CG comprises the carrier, which is the nucleus; a Carrier Air Wing consisting of numerous squadrons; Guided Missile Cruisers; a Destroyer Squadron with two to three Guided Missile Destroyers, up to two attack submarines; and a combined ammunition, oiler and supply ship for logistic support. Without these defence platforms, the CG is a sitting duck.

Typical carrier maintenance periods range from six to eleven months, depending upon where the ship is in its comprehensive maintenance cycle. Owing to threat scenarios, navies may defer scheduled maintenance but this will enhance risk for the crew, and in the long run, escalate the cost of operations and maintenance.

There is also a different kind of threat associated with longer deployments. Crew fatigue and morale can degrade over the course of a lengthened operation. Indian armed forces track record of buckling under stress is already rather dismal.

In view of above-named factors, it is concluded that India has acquired another white elephant only to serve its own megalomania.

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16 July 2013

The Snowden affair

Dmitry Evstafiev

As the long, strange saga of Edward Snowden comes to a close, what impact will it have on U.S. relations with Europe and Russia?
People hold portraits of former U.S. spy agency contractor Edward Snowden (left) and U.S. Army Private First Class Bradley Manning in front of their faces during a protest in Berlin, on July 4, 2013. Photo: Reuters
The case of former CIA analyst Edward Snowden has been on the front pages of major newspapers all over the world on a daily basis for three weeks now. However, as time goes by, the affair looks more like a slapstick comedy than a political scandal.
The lack of balance between Snowden’s status and the importance of the data that he leaked has been apparent since the scandal erupted. Based on the political impact that he has caused, it seems Snowden is just a ‘front person’ who may not be fully aware of his real role. It looks like the second-tier CIA analyst has been used by those in opposition to incumbent president Barack Obama as a way to spoil the G8 summit in Northern Ireland.
Obama’s opponents have largely succeeded. There is reason to believe that the ‘telephone data’ was the real reason why Obama had to postpone the announcement of his proposals to further cut arsenals of strategic weapons, although some proposals had been expected to be voiced at the summit. As a result, the arms cut proposal, which had been designed to put Russia – and President Putin in particular – in a difficult position, lost its relevance and was easily parried by the Russian side.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume that Snowden delivered a deadly blow to Washington’s reputation. He damaged the enviable reputation of President Obama, who has been perceived as someone capable of reintroducing almost forgotten democratic values to U.S. politics.
People would have been far less shocked to learn that the George W. Bush administration was tapping the phones of its allies. That was something that everyone could expect from a Republican administration. However, expectations for Obama are totally different and so is the reason why he was hastily presented with the Nobel Peace Prize.
We can’t say the scandal has damaged the strategic relationship between the United States and the European Union. Does anyone really think that the modern European elites are ready to have a spat with the United States because it is keeping a close eye on the integrity of its allies? At the end of the day, Washington has every right to do so.
If the European Union were really badly hurt, European nations wouldn’t be looking for Snowden on board of the Bolivian president’s jet so eagerly. The strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union builds on such a strong political and economic dependence of the European states on Washington that not even ten Snowden affairs can shake it. Incidentally, it was the European Union, and not Washington, that remained tactfully silent and then created an international scandal by quarrelling with what seems the entire Latin American region.
There’s a good chance that Washington will profit from the scandal. Amid some quite controversial recent initiatives (the Taliban talks, its unwillingness to interfere in the Syrian conflict and cooling of its ties with Turkey), some phantom conflict would come in handy to distract the political elites, the media and experts.
The Snowden saga in the Moscow airport is a good lesson. Everyone would be happy, especially the United States, if some country offered Snowden asylum. In other words, everything would be easier if some other country dealt with the ‘headache’, agreed to be placed under Washington’s propaganda pressure, and become a target for criticism.
Interestingly, Snowden was a lot more willing to end up in a European Union country than Venezuela, Bolivia or Cuba. For one thing, he didn’t seem particularly happy to get an invitation from Venezuela. Snowden missed a dozen chances to go to a country that would not extradite him to the United States, while seeking asylum from the nations that would hardly grant it to him.
A perfect scenario for Snowden would be to get asylum in Russia. And it seems that this is the option the ‘analyst’ himself hinted at most strongly through all channels, primarily Wikileaks. This impression only became stronger when Snowden missed his flight to Cuba for some strange reason and stayed at a Moscow airport.
In other words, it was Russia that was supposed to let this ‘headache’ into its territory, give more reasons to demonize itself and then live with this ‘headache’ while having no chance to shape the media activity of the ‘champion of democracy’.
The fact that Russia agreed to asylum only under certain conditions outlined by President Putin, especially the cessation of Snowden’s anti-American campaign, has disappointed Washington.
What lesson can be learned from the Snowden affair? No one will be safe under the cover of secrecy in the age of information transparency, even those who believe they enjoy a technological advantage. Information society is a dangerous double-edged weapon that can decide when to attack on its own.

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Much debated issue of strategic depth

Brig Asif Haroon Raja

Pakistan has been playing a constructive role in resolving internal feuds of Afghanistan since 1980s and has avoided the game of pitching one ethnic community against the other to serve its selfish interests. All the seven Mujahideen groups involved in Afghanistan Jihad against the Soviet forces had placed their trust in Islamabad. Nawaz Sharif during his first stint from 1990 to 1993 had a role in persuading the Afghan warring groups to mend fences and agree to an arrangement of holding reins of power in Kabul in turn for six months. The agreement didn’t last because of President Burhanuddin Rabbani refusing to hand over power on expiry of his tenure. It angered Gulbadin Hikmatyar and re-triggered internecine war.
When unknown Taliban entered the arena at the request of the Afghanis to rid them of the perverse influence of warlords and captured Kandahar in 1994, Pakistan’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar offered them a hand of friendship and convinced them not to waylay Pakistani trucks carrying goods. After seizing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban pushed Northern Alliance (NA) under Ahmad Shah Masood to northern Afghanistan. Pakistan didn’t cede to Kabul’s repeated request to recognize Taliban regime. They were told to first take all ethnic communities on board. When NA cracked up and several of their leaders like Gen Malik tilted towards Taliban because of differences with their party leaders, the Taliban exploited their infighting and captured Mazar-e-Sharif in May 1997. This breakthrough prompted Pakistan to accord recognition to Taliban regime and soon after Saudi Arabia and UAE followed suit.
It is a well-known fact that Pakistan enjoyed excellent relations with Taliban regime. The latter was beholden to Pakistan for the reason that most had grown up in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Many received religious education in Madrassahs including the ones run by Maulanas Samiul Haq and Mufti Mahmood. They had not forgotten the role of Pakistan in Afghan Jihad and hosting five million Afghan refugees. Even now, 3.1 million registered and non-registered refugees are living in Pakistan. The Taliban regime was helped by Pakistan in overcoming its teething problems.
The two neighbors cemented their relations so affectionately that it gave birth to the idea of strategic depth. It implied any of the two countries getting overwhelmed by an adversary falling back to an alternative position in depth to regroup and then strike back. It also envisaged coming to the assistance of the aggressed country and collectively fighting the adversary. The underlying reason behind this concept was Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth and all its core areas and strategic communications placed perilously close to its eastern border with India.
Friendly Afghanistan under Taliban dashed Indian military’s plan of encircling Pakistan by posing a threat from the east and the west and also took care of Pakistan’s vulnerability of strategic depth. However, this concept was neither incorporated in our defence policy nor practiced in any war game. In erstwhile East Pakistan, our forces had no such option during the 1971 war to prolong the war. Against overwhelming odds, they could either perish or surrender. Russia got saved from getting overwhelmed by French forces under Napoleon and then by German forces because of its vast strategic depth. While our pseudo intellectuals have been ridiculing this concept without understanding the spirit behind it, none ever highlighted Indian encirclement plan which was set into motion in 2002.
All the goodwill and camaraderie earned by Pakistan was washed away by Gen Musharraf when he ditched Taliban and befriended USA after 9/11. Although Afghan Pashtuns as a whole suffered a great deal at the hands of US-NATO forces aided by Pakistan but Taliban suffered the most. Rationally speaking, the Taliban should have never forgiven Pakistan for the wounds it inflicted upon them, but it is their large heartedness that they are still trusting Pakistan. They must have comprehended the dilemma of Pakistan in that timeframe when it was given a choice to either assist USA in its military adventure or else get destroyed.
In case of exercise of second option, there would have been no safe haven in FATA for the Taliban to fall back, regroup and fight back to reclaim lost territory. The Taliban made good use of the concept of strategic depth by undertaking a tactical withdrawal into FATA to save Afghanistan and its people from getting annihilated. Pakistan too agreed to US demands under similar constraints. Afghanistan’s destruction was inevitable even if Pakistan had not ceded to US demand of becoming a coalition partner.
Another aspect worth noting is that Pakistan has suffered the major brunt of war in Afghanistan since 1979. If Pakistan betrayed Afghanistan in 2001; successive regimes in Kabul have been bad mouthing Pakistan and had preferred India over Pakistan. Hamid Karzai has all along been casting aspersions and leveling baseless allegations against Pakistan. He has helped India in fulfilling its dream of posing twin threat to the security of Pakistan.
Karzai having failed to woo Taliban is convinced that his failure is owed to Pakistan military. He and his regime carry the perception that Taliban leaders are in the pocket of Pak military. This perception is erroneous since Pakistan doesn’t enjoy decisive influence over them to make them change their principles and chartered goals. However, it is a fact that Pakistan today is better placed than any country in the world to interact with Taliban and reach at an amicable solution to Afghan crisis. Afghan Taliban are mindful of the fact that Pakistan is providing strategic depth to them and as such remain inclined towards Pakistan.
In Pakistan, there has been too much of stress on Pashtun and non-Pashtun Afghans because of misplaced animosity of non-Pashtuns that Islamabad helped the Taliban in capturing power in 1996. It must not be overlooked that 95% of Afghanistan population comprise of Sunnis. Hence our aim should be to establish rapport with Sunnis rather than remaining fixed on ethnicity.  It is indeed very satisfying that despite Northern Alliance (NA) tilt towards India and its open-ended antagonism against Pakistan, the ISI didn’t get carried away by emotions and not only maintained links with Taliban that had been ditched by Pakistan after 9/11, but also kept making subtle efforts to befriend NA leaders. ISI’s sustained efforts started bearing fruit after Abdullah Abdullah pitched against Karzai in November 2009 presidential elections lost the race due to massive rigging and foreign interference. His confrontation with Karzai and his Pashtun supporters brought him closer to Pakistan and he responded positively to ISI’s friendly gestures.
Gen Kayani and DG ISI Lt Gen Zaheer were instrumental in persuading the Taliban to open their political office in Doha and to restart talks that were stalled in March 2012 because the US didn’t stick to its promise of swapping prisoners. They are again making efforts to convince the Taliban to make their Doha office functional, after Karzai’s needless sabre rattling over the issue of plaque and flag last month. The two are in a position to bring warring Pashtun and non-Pashtun leaders to the negotiating table and reach a political solution. The situation has further become conducive after the takeover by Nawaz Sharif.
While it is true that the US is unclear about its safe exit and future course of events in Afghanistan in post 2014 period, Pakistan too is not clear as to how it intends dealing with Afghanistan once the security vacuum is created. No roadmap has been devised except for rhetoric that we want peaceful and friendly Afghanistan. So far, the dice is loaded against Pakistan. While the US led ISAF is all set to run away from Afghanistan without taming Taliban, Pakistan will be left at its own to confront the combined wrath of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in the aftermath of 2014.
The US must reciprocate Pakistan’s efforts for peaceful transition in Afghanistan by sapping ties with TTP and persuading India and Karzai regime to do the same. The US must play its role in ending covert war against Pakistan from Afghan soil. A solution is possible if the US plays a straight game and doesn’t get influenced by intriguer India which is highly upset over the recent developments and peeved Karzai who is feeling left out.

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Libya and the Egyptian coup

Umar Khan

The overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, the first Egyptian president from the long-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) will have a lasting impact on the politics of the region. Given its historical, social and geographical position, developments in Egypt are always felt in the region – and it was no different in the Arab awakening. It was the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime that encouraged the Libyans to rise against the former dictator, Muammar Qaddafi.
The recent ambush on the legitimacy of the Egyptian president and mandate of the Ikhwan has made the Islamists weary of the whole democratic process; this situation is sure to impact so-called political Islam. Egypt’s political scene has always affected Libya and this crisis is already disillusioning the religious armed brigades from the democratic process in the country.
The Egyptian crisis has encouraged people in Libya to demand the dissolution of the Islamist-led highest legislative body, the General National Congress (GNC). Forming government in Egypt was an experiment for Islamists in the region who were hesitant in trusting the ballot box but were being persuaded by other religious scholars who saw the democratic process as the best way to move forward.
It was right after the military coup in Egypt that efforts to dissolve both the interim government and the GNC of Libya found some support. The fall of Morsi and the Ikhwan in Egypt led to a series of accusations on the Libyan Ikhwan, which is part of both the interim government and the GNC. A major campaign was launched to malign Islamists elsewhere to eventually repeat the Egyptian scenario.
It was really after the GNC election in Libya that the faultlines started to emerge between the Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi) and self-proclaimed liberals. These had originally been drawn during the eight-month revolution on the basis of distrust between the groups and the international support different groups were getting to further their agenda.
The GNC is a 200-member body that was elected on July 7, 2012 in the first election in over four decades. The electoral law distributed the 200 seats as 80 seats reserved for party lists and the other 120 for individual candidates. Self-proclaimed liberals managed to secure 39 out of 80 party-lists seats. However, they were only able to secure 40 out of the 120 seats reserved for individuals. The voter turnout of 62 percent was enough to award it the mandate to see Libya through this tough time.
The elections were organised by the National Transition Council (NTC) of Libya that emerged in the beginning of the revolution as the de facto government. It ruled for roughly 17 months and gave Libya its first elections and then, setting a healthy precedent, exited the political scene.
The Arab awakening had ushered in a new era for political Islam across the region, encouraging participation of people who were once involved in an armed struggle against previous regimes in the name of religion. Most of these people, who had agreed to take part in the elections, had been staunchly opposing democracy for the better part of their lives but the shift in the dynamics of this region made them redefine their strategy. Persuading radicals to become a part of the electoral process was considered one of the most important achievements of Arab awakening – until recently.
Libya was hoping to buck the trend of chaos that followed the Arab awakening with massive participation of religious leaders in the polls. Some of the leaders who contested elections in Libya were former jihadis who had been arrested and renditioned back to Libya after the US-Afghan war.
The idea of democracy wasn’t attractive for many who looked at it with suspicion, thinking of it in terms of western influence. They considered it a western tool designed to dictate policies to Muslim countries and were not willing to accept it. This was the case with several groups in Libya, mostly from the conservative eastern part. They were not only apprehensive of the idea of democracy but were ready to resist it and their intent was shown clearly in a rally they held in the second biggest city of Benghazi in eastern Libya.
The success of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia was the push that many in Libya needed to convince others of democracy’s importance in today’s world. Meetings were held and many were successful to the extent that some of these groups launched political bodies/parties with an eye to participate in the future elections. However, with each emerging detail about the Egyptian coup, they would think their suspicions were not unfounded.
The divisions in the GNC, that nearly reflects the fragmented Libyan society, were clear from the beginning when the formation of the crisis government was delayed. This was followed by the removal of the first prime minister before he took over his role; when his cabinet was twice rejected for not being ‘inclusive’. Libya is currently going through a rough patch and trying to cope up with post-revolutionary problems.
The Qaddafi loyalists, although in minority, are still trying to destabilise the country for personal gains. The remaining members of the Qaddafi family, currently in Oman, have distanced themselves from any trouble but some aides of the slain dictator are still involved in creating disturbance. Qaddafi ruled for 42 years, but by pitting tribe against tribe and awarding key positions to influential tribes. Now these people are struggling to move on, realising they don’t stand at the same positions they used to and some are conspiring with exiled leaders to undermine the new rulers.
The problems in Turkey and Tunisia were slight indicators and the hurdles faced by the Islamist rulers of Egypt did not go unnoticed by some groups. The distrust that many influential leaders were trying to curb was only growing as there was nothing substantial on the ground to support the assertions made by these leaders. On the contrary, wherever Islamists rose to power through democratic elections, their mandate was undermined by either court rulings or foreign pressure.
These signs were enough for a few leaders in Libya who started planning to reactivate the armed brigades that had not been dissolved, only temporarily sidelined. They argue that Islamists would never be allowed to govern even if they were to win overwhelming majority at the ballot box. Instead they (Islamists) only fall prey to conspiracies – and they want to be ready when this happens.
The lack of faith in democracy was deep-seated in the Islamists, but was slowly changing with the new dynamics. However, it is back to square one now. After the recent events in Egypt, mistrust is at its peak and one notion that many Islamists are increasingly turning to is, ‘its only democracy when we (Islamists) lose. There are more than a few examples from the recent past to learn from’.
The unfortunate and bloody events in Egypt have made the task of inviting Islamists for political dialogue almost impossible. They have put Libya at risk of descending into further chaos since groups that were once hoping to spread change through the democratic process will now seek other ways of achieving their goals.

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16 July 2013

Taliban, Musharraf and other hot topics

Ayaz Wazir

Musharraf’s trial and talks with the Taliban were the most talked about topics till the unveiling of the Abbottabad Commission Report. Both issues were debated and discussed at length.
First, the Taliban talks. There are opposing schools of thought on this – one in favour of negotiations and the other dead set against them. Those favouring talks put forward the argument, and rightly so, that if only use of brute force could have solved the problem that would have happened long ago. But that is not the case. Neither have militants been eliminated nor have military operations weakened their resolve. On the contrary, they are more dangerous than before.
Those who oppose talks with the Taliban refer to past agreements that they think were violated by the Taliban. This argument is not tenable for the simple reason that the agreements were not violated by the Taliban but sabotaged by the US. The first such agreement that was concluded between the army and the Taliban (General Safdar Husain and commander Nek Mohammad Wazir) in the Shakai area of South Waziristan was blown to smithereens within hours by the US drone attack that killed Nek Muhammad.
The US, it may be recalled, was in no mood at that time even to hear the word Taliban, leave alone talking to them, and was against Pakistan entering into any agreement whatsoever with the Taliban. The latest attack to sabotage an agreement was the recent one on Waliur Rehman Mehsud, widely believed to have been nominated by the TTP leadership to conduct negotiations with the government of Pakistan. However, he was killed in a US drone strike near Miran Shah in North Waziristan.
Some people argue that peace talks have never been taken seriously by the Taliban and that they use such occasions as breathing space for regrouping and replenishing their resources. This argument, if taken seriously, belittles our own troops by making it seem like they do not take necessary precautionary measures which should have been a part of their training as well as the defence strategy.
While arguing for or against negotiations with the Taliban we overlook yet another important aspect required for the success of such endeavours. This is to address the core issue of militancy, which has caused friction between the government and the general public in this so-called war on terror imposed upon us by a dictator on one telephone call from Washington. The government wants to remain a frontline ally of the US and at the same time conclude an agreement with the Taliban.
The Taliban are not buying that. They, like the general public, would like the government to reconsider its policy towards the war in accordance with its own national interests rather than those of others. We want to have good relations with every country, including the US, but not at the cost of our own security.
Only if it does this will the government win the hearts and minds of the people who are at present shying away from fully supporting the armed forces deployed in that region.
The US, which invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and is the root cause of militancy in the region, has already started talks with the Taliban after having unsuccessfully used all means at its disposal to eliminate them with force. If the US can enter into negotiations with its worst enemy what is so drastically wrong with us that we cannot talk to our own citizens who have gone astray for one reason or another?
Now to Musharraf’s trial. Not being a legal expert, I cannot offer any comment from that perspective but merely look at it from an ordinary citizen's point of view. One question that comes to mind is whether his rule was good or bad for the country. In other words, was his taking over power unconstitutionally, forcibly and the subsequent imposition of emergency beneficial for the nation? And have the policies that he pursued done the country any good?
Since the action of October 12, 1999 – though illegal and unconstitutional – has already been dealt with by the competent authority let us, for the time being, leave it there and move forward. The declaration of emergency in the country when the situation did not warrant it was equally bad, illegal and unconstitutional and was declared so by the apex court and so were his other policies that he imposed on the nation.
Despite all his wrongdoings, efforts are afoot these days to propagate the fear that if he is tried for treason under the constitution, it may lead to provoking the army into taking action. In other words, the army may topple the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif once again.
Only time will tell whether the army reacts or not, but what is amply clear is that the people of Pakistan are in no mood to accept any illegal and unconstitutional interference. Gen Musharraf has not performed any great and inestimable services to the army that it will take up the cudgels on his behalf, especially at this point when it is cognisant of the mood of the people and is also embroiled in quelling terrorist activity in the country.
His trial does not mean the army is under trial. It is the trial of an individual and that too of a retiree who lived in exile for obvious reasons and returned to the country for personal political purposes, against the discreet advice of the institution to which he once belonged. So let us not drag the army into his trial.
The court has already initiated proceedings in the matter and now wants to take the case to its logical conclusion. Since the government has now acted correctly and in accordance with the constitution by lending support to the Supreme Court, we should appreciate it and not derail the process.
Musharraf's nine-year rule was full of misadventures but the worst among them was his disrespect to the Quaid by dishonouring the commitment he had made with the tribesmen in 1948 when they joined Pakistan after Jinnah’s agreement to withdraw armed forces from there, assuring them no interference in their affairs would take place without taking them into confidence.
The general broke the Quaid’s pledge by inducting the army in Fata without consulting the people there. This is equal to, if not worse than, imposing emergency in the country. This action became the real cause of militancy in the area, which is now spreading all over the country. Musharraf must be held accountable for the destruction wrought in Fata and for the life of each and every innocent man, woman and child lost in this unwanted war on terror.

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Safeguarding the IMF programme

Dr Ashfaque H Khan

Pakistan and the IMF have reached a staff-level agreement for a $5.3 billion bailout programme under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Before this programme is presented to the executive board for approval in early September, Pakistan will have to implement certain prior actions. One of the prior actions is the fiscal commitments by the Council of Common Interest (CCI).
What is the fiscal commitment required from the CCI? Why is it so important for the success of the IMF programme? In plain language, issues emerging after the NFC Award form the linchpin for the success of the IMF programme. Without addressing these, the IMF programme will never succeed; hence, a prior action needs to be taken on this account.
Readers may recall that since the new NFC Award was agreed in 2009, I have time and again pointed out that an inherent defect exists in this award. Quite simply, without addressing this, there can never be fiscal discipline in the country or macroeconomic stability. I have also been suggesting ways to address this issue, advice that has been ignored because it did not carry a $5.3 billion bailout package.
The IMF took note of my writing and in Article IV Consultation report of 2011, it devoted considerable pages under the title ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in Pakistan: Too Much, Too Fast?’ (IMF Country Report no.12/35, February 2012). It agreed with my suggestion that a binding constraint has to be introduced to assure attainment of the overall fiscal deficit target by coordinating provincial and federal fiscal targets.
It is now well-known that in the presence of the existing NFC Award, there can never be fiscal discipline in the country and the success of the IMF programme will remain a distant dream. This fact is known to the IMF as well. While the central authority representing the member country is essential, provincial governments will have to be taken on board to achieve all the fiscal targets.
The onus of maintaining fiscal discipline, and thereby macroeconomic stability, has now been shifted to the provinces after the new NFC Award. The federal finance minister will not be able to deliver on fiscal targets without the firm support of the provincial governments. This is what is going to be discussed in the CCI. The approval of the CCI as prior action will be critical for the submission of the programme before the executive board of the IMF.
At present, the 7th NFC Award, which was introduced in 2010, is operative. The bulk of the resources have been earmarked for the provinces, since they have been receiving 56 percent in 2010-11 and 57.5 percent in 2011-12 onward of the net divisible pool. The federal government, accordingly, is receiving 44 percent and 42.5 percent respectively. Reduction of collection charges from five percent to one percent has caused a loss of four percent of the net proceeds of the divisible pool taxes to the federal government.
This award was too extensive, too fast and lacked economic foundation. It was finalised in extreme haste and can be described, at best, as a political award. Enormous resources are being transferred to the provinces through this award where there has never been fiscal discipline. Indeed, the provinces lacked the capacity to spend money prudently. Provincial fiscal effort has already been witnessing a secular decline. This award has further eroded desire or compulsion to mobilise their own resources.
In short, the new NFC Award has been a disaster for Pakistan’s fiscal balance. It has promoted fiscal indiscipline, particularly in the provinces, resulting in the persistence of large fiscal deficit, averaging eight percent per annum over the last three years (since the NFC Award).
Since over 60 percent resources are being transferred to the provinces with a demonstrated tendency towards fiscal indiscipline, this NFC Award sowed the seeds for perpetual macroeconomic crisis in the country. The IMF programme, on the other hand, is designed to achieve macroeconomic stability, which is in direct conflict with the character of the NFC Award. This conflict has to be addressed in the CCI as prior action.
Those who were at the helm of affairs from the federal government side have done a great disservice to the nation. Provincial finance ministers and their experts achieved beyond their expectations. Those representing the federal government were oblivious of the technical details, did not do their homework and moved too fast to complete the exercise with severe consequences for the economy. The then federal finance minister and the finance secretary should have realised that they were sowing the seeds of perpetual macroeconomic crisis through their actions.
Larger resources entail greater responsibilities and stricter financial discipline. There should have been a gradual rise in transfer of resources. In fact, the transfer should have been linked with capacity-building in provinces. Now that the damage has already been done, provincial governments need to develop their capacity to spend their money efficiently and effectively.
What should be discussed in the CCI meeting? One thing is absolutely clear: the deliberation will not be smooth. For both the federal and the provincial governments, arriving at a consensus will be a challenging task. The federal government will insist upon a targeted surplus in provincial budgets for which a binding constraint will be required. The provincial governments will simply say “give us the budgeted revenue; we will give you the targeted surplus”.
In the fixing of the revenue target, particularly for the FBR, the federal government is at fault. It has always treated revenue as a residual item, and as such, revenue target has nothing to do with the level of economic activity in the country. We finalise our expenditure plan first and then decide the budget deficit number acceptable to various stakeholders. Once these two numbers are finalised, the only unknown remaining is the revenue number.
Fixing the highly ambitious revenue target is the compulsion of the federal government because it has to accommodate projects of the influential. Once the revenue target is fixed and the resources are allocated to the provinces according to the NFC Award, the provincial governments prepare their expenditure plan. When revenue collection falls short of the revenue target during the fiscal year, the provincial governments cannot adjust their expenditure plan accordingly. Expecting a targeted surplus from the provinces, and at the same time not giving them budgeted revenue, is grossly unfair on the part of the federal government.
The CCI must listen to both parties. Both are at fault and both need to adjust to the requirements themselves. The federal government should set a realistic revenue target for the FBR, agree with the provinces on surpluses and devise a mechanism to collect surpluses during the fiscal year.
The current revenue target for the FBR (Rs2,475 billion) is grossly over-ambitious and, therefore, the provincial governments are highly unlikely to deliver budgeted surpluses. This is a serious risk to the IMF programme. The CCI must come up with a workable solution before early September, lest the staff-level agreement is not presented before the IMF board.